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Emerging countries like India, China and Russia who are under pressure to 
contribute to a mandatory mitigation regime in the forthcoming climate 
protocol also view the issue of financing as crucial to their future role in 
ensuring a low carbon pathway of growth. Whether they contribute to the 
process of mitigating climate change, both developing countries and 
emerging economies are vulnerable to global warming. The central 
proposition advanced in this paper is that any global climate financial 
architecture that recognizes the fact that mitigation and adaptation are inter-
linked, the latter being conditioned by the former, has the best chance of 
success. The paper seeks to demonstrate that as investments on mitigation 
rises, risks on adaptation projects decrease, thus contributing to improved risk 
adjusted return from adaptation projects. With reference to coastal, water and 
degraded lands ecosystems in India, the paper demonstrates how higher 
levels of mitigation efforts reduce the capital costs of adaptation activities in 
developing countries. The paper also suggests that carbon markets need to be 
reformed through improved and varied functions that facilitate technology 
transfer, provide differential prices for different carbon products, facilitate 
enhanced access by developing country sellers and enable efficient carbon 
price discovery for sellers from developing world. 
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Introduction 
Climate financing and technology transfer issues are critical to the 
success of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Even if 
the Copenhagen Summit of the Conference of Parties to the FCCC 
succeeds in cobbling a successor to the Kyoto Protocol in December 2009, 
it is certain that the world community will continue to grapple with the 
financial issues relating to climate change for a few more years. 
Developing countries of the world consider financing as the important 
element that will determine the extent to which they would be involved in 
international action to reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGs). 
Emerging countries like India, China and Russia who are under pressure to 
contribute to a mandatory mitigation regime in the forthcoming climate 
protocol also view  the issue of financing as crucial to their future role in 
ensuring a low carbon pathway of growth.  Whether they contribute to the 
process of mitigating climate change, both developing countries and 
emerging economies are vulnerable to global warming. Their capacities to 
adapt to global warming are not commensurate to the gravity of the 
problem they are likely to face in the event of global temperatures rising 
above the present levels by 20 C. Thus for these countries adaptation and 
adaptation finances form greater priorities than mitigation. The lesser the 
capacity of these countries to adapt to climate change , the greater will be 
their inability to achieve economic growth and welfare. On the other hand, 
the higher the adaptation capabilities or lower their adaptation 
requirements, the greater will be the ability of these countries to contribute 
to reduction in global warming.  The central proposition advanced in this 
paper is that any global climate financial architecture that recognizes the 
fact that mitigation and adaptation are inter-linked , the latter being 
conditioned by the former, has the best chance of success. This paper seeks 
to analyze its proposition at two levels. First at the conceptual level by 
looking at how far existing expert economic assessments on climate 
change cast light on the inter-linkage between mitigation and adaptation 
and the co-benefit possibilities of the former. At the second level we 
broadly survey the proposals on climate financing that have emanated in 
the world in the run up to the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change 
slated for December 2009. We start the first level analysis with the more 
recent  Stern Report on climate change (Stern, 2008) . 
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Recent Perspectives on Climate Change and Economic 
Mechanisms 
In his recent Report, Stern (2008) has cast light on what he considers 
to be the critical challenges for addressing the rise in global temperatures:  
(a) The action for preventing global warming must be effective, efficient 
and equitable. By effectiveness is meant cuts in GHG emissions on the 
required scale to keep risks at acceptable levels. By efficiency is 
meant implementation in the most cost-effective way and by equity is 
meant special focus on the needs of poor countries that are hardest hit 
and responsibilities by rich countries that have accounted for past 
emissions and demonstration by 2020 that they can deliver credible 
reductions without threatening growth and designing systems for  
transfer of funds and technologies.  
(b)  Subject to the scenario above ,’ a formal expectation that developing 
countries would  also be expected to take on binding national targets 
of their own by 2020’, meanwhile ‘benefiting  from one-sided selling 
of emissions credits in the interim’; 
(c) Fast growing middle income developing countries or emerging 
economies ‘with higher incomes will need to take immediate action in 
order to stabilize and reverse emissions growth, including sectoral 
targets and, possibly, earlier national targets 
(d) Given strong developed country targets for reductions, ‘carbon prices 
can be maintained at levels which will provide incentives both for 
reductions at home and purchases from abroad’.  
(e) ‘The cheapest mitigation options often reside in developing countries, 
which should take advantage of carbon markets from the outset’ 
(f) By putting an appropriate price on carbon, policymakers will oblige 
consumers and producers to face up to the full social cost of their 
emissions’. 
(g) Economic efficiency points to the advantages of a ‘broadly 
comparable global price and coordinated policy based on carbon 
trading’, with openness to international trade ‘so that emissions 
reductions take place wherever they are cheapest’. ‘It is possible to put 
a price on carbon, explicitly through tax or trading or implicitly 
through regulation’. 
(h) By 2050, out of a total global population of nine billion, some eight 
billion will reside in what is currently the developing world. These 
numbers make clear that a reduction in global emissions of 50% 
  
6
relative to 1990 levels by 2050 simply cannot be achieved without per-
capita providing an incentive for the cheapest abatement opportunities 
to be exploited, while the source of the finance is driven by the 
location and stringency of the emissions caps’ 
(i) Policies will need to be: 
• dynamically efficient in linking the degree of support for technologies 
to their potential or actual performance in reducing carbon emissions;  
• market-based, encouraging competition between different technology 
suppliers;  
• catalytic in mobilizing private sector capital to make investments and 
take risks;  
• global, opening up and integrating low-carbon technology  markets in 
a way that accelerates their scale-up;  
• equitable, by placing the bulk of the public funding requirements on 
richer nations; and  
• explicit, making transparent the ‘cost per tonne’ of delivered 
abatement of different technology options. 
(j) On adaptation challenges in developing countries, the following form 
(verbatim)  the highlights of recommendations: 
• Just as adaptation planning needs to be integrated into development 
plans and strategies, so should adaptation funding  be integrated into 
development spending at regional, national and local levels  
• Money should be spent through national development plans, 
reflecting overall national priorities. 
• Making adaptation funding conditional on demonstrating an 
incremental (climate change specific) need would fail to address 
underlying vulnerabilities, may produce perverse incentives and 
prioritisation by discouraging investment in measures that are not 
clearly ‘adaptation’ or ‘development’ specific, and may not be cost-
effective 
(k) Post-2015 the additional costs (induced by climate change) of 
pursuing goals of development and poverty reduction should be a key 
element in assessing the appropriate scale of development assistance. 
Indeed the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in its meeting of October 
18–19, 2009 at London reinforced the Stern point of view, when it 
highlighted the ‘potential role of carbon markets to deliver private sector 
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investment in developing countries, in addition to public finance’ and went 
on to state that ‘these flows could deliver significant benefits to developing 
countries in terms of both on the ground investment and environmental and 
energy security co-benefits’. The Stern Report’s emphasis on mitigation 
commitments by developing and emerging economies has also been 
echoed by the MEF as evident form the forum’s emphasis on 
‘internationalization of mitigation targets’ and ‘report and review’ as the 
key building blocks of the mitigation architecture. 
The Trade Angle 
Apart from the above stated perspectives of the Stern Report and 
MEF, the emergence of the trade angle has been another issue worthy of 
note in recent times. For some time pressures have been mounting on India 
and China to take up mandatory mitigation commitments in the post 2012 
phase. This has not met with success as both countries are resistant to the 
idea. Whether the trade angle is a negotiating ploy or a serious option to 
redress the problem is not clear. However the introduction of the trade 
angle, that seeks to discriminate commodities and manufactured goods 
with high carbon footprint through suitable adjustments in border taxes, 
virtually puts pressure on export intensive emerging countries like China 
on the defensive. Indeed the recent arguments that prohibitions on carbon 
footprint manufactured goods can be justified under Article XX of the 
GATT (Metcalf, 2009) if applied in consonance of the national treatment 
principle of the GATT/WTO would add to the pressures for acceding to 
mandatory mitigation commitments on the part of both countries. Even if 
border adjustments are replaced by pre – border mechanisms like surrender 
of permits in lieu of exports of high carbon goods is introduced, this will 
affect countries which have accumulated large stocks of hot air permits 
like Russia or large amount of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) like 
China and India. 
Implications for Climate and Adaptation Financing  
The benchmark of an efficient and just system of financing global 
public goods centers on the following parameters viz ‘new and additional, 
predictable, adequate and equitable’. The principles of equity, efficiency 
and effectiveness have been defined in the context of the climate change 
deal by the Stern Report, can be applied to environmental financing 
systems as well.  
Despite the importance accorded by the world community for 
financing activities that address climate change issues, nothing much has 
  
8
been achieved in tangible terms. The concept of ‘adequacy’ of 
environmental financing can be judged by the supply of funds relative to 
needs. Alternatively it can be taken to mean flow of funds that are 
sufficient to cover relevant costs (Muller 2008, p. 24). Flow of funds for 
development and global environmental causes has not been encouraging 
even in years when the global economy was booming. In the year 2007, 
ODA flows through bilateral and multilateral channels was only of the 
order of US$ 103.7 billion (UNFCCC, 2008, p. 91). This represented on an 
average 0.23% of the GDP of developed countries as against the Monterry 
ODA Target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (ibid, 2008)1. 
While funds that are available for adaptation and mitigation are 
inadequate, in the case of adaptation the situation is worse as private funds 
do not have a propensity to investing in adaptation projects as compared to 
mitigation projects.  
Nearly 60% of total global investment in environmental projects has 
been mobilized from domestic sources (p. 90). While FDI and debts 
account for 20% in EU, they account for 90% in Africa and Middle East 
(ibid, p. 90). Annual availability of adaptation funds has been less than 
$500 million/year (ibid p. 92). By comparison, funds annual available for 
mitigation is pegged close to $ I billion /year. These figures pale into 
insignificance when reckoned against the figures of revenue generation 
from CDM and JI projects ($ 9billion) in 2007 (ibid, p. 92). 
Estimates vary about the scale of funding required for adaptation. 
While the World Bank guesstimates current needs to be of the order of 9 to 
41 billion US dollars ($), UNDP estimates are higher at $86 billion. The 
UNFCCC places adaptation funding requirements to be in the range of 
$28−67 billion (Muller 2008, p. 6).The World Bank’s estimates are based 
on anticipated flows from ODA, FDI and domestic investment towards 
adaptation activities. It is reckoned by the Bank that 10 to 20% of the ODA 
and concessional flows amounting to $4 billion to $ 8 billion will flow for 
adaptation activities. The Bank likewise estimates that 10 to 20% of FDI 
flows amounting to $2–$4 billion will find its way to funding adaptation 
activities. Gross domestic investment is expected to contribute $3billion to 
$30 billion which works out to be 2–10% share of aggregate domestic 
investment (Muller 2008, p. 6). 
The terms ‘new’ and ‘additional’, which form the other attributes of a 
sound environmental financing system, have more complex implications. 
By additional is meant ‘over and above ODA’ (Muller, op.cit, p. 21). In a 
deeper sense, from a developing country perspective, the term ’new’ could 
mean a new source of financing that is different from existing ones. The 
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term ‘additional’ is related to the equity dimension of environmental 
financing.  
Maxims of Delivery of Financial Resources and Governance 
Issues 
Article 11 of the UNFCCC provides for a financial mechanism that 
functions under the aegis of the COP of the Convention. This proviso 
forms the basic principle underlying a financial mechanism that is set up to 
fund adaptation activities as envisaged by the Convention.  Delivery of 
financial resources for adaptation will depend upon a combination of 
factors. The first factor involves the adoption of resource allocation criteria 
that is based on a mix of efficiency and equity principles. The second 
factor refers to the ease by which needy countries can access the financial 
mechanism. 
Sagasti et al (2005) argue that the efficiency of a financial mechanism 
refers both to the total amount of development financing available and to 
the match between financial instruments and the needs of developing 
countries. Presently in the GEF scheme of things, allocation follows the 
principle of geographical and sectoral balances (UNFCCC, 2008, p. 96). 
The system seeks to follow transparency and cost effectiveness, based on a 
combination of global environmental benefits and country performance 
(GEF EO, 2008 as cited in UNFCCC, 2008). However the resource 
allocation framework of the GEF is considered to be complex (ibid). There 
are issues relating to effectiveness and efficiency, predictability (in project 
selection) and the length of the GEF project cycle ( ibid,p. 90).  
Currently adaptation financing focuses on global and national 
environmental benefits. The Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) funds 
under the GET Trust fund requires generation of global environmental 
benefits. The LDCF (Least Developed Countries Fund) and the SCCF 
(Special Climate Change Fund) under the GEF apply only when climate 
change affects core sectors of development such as agriculture, water, 
health or infrastructure. It does not carry the requirement of generating 
global environmental benefits (UNFCCC 2008, p. 44). GEF considers 
costs of adaptation as costs imposed on vulnerable countries to meet their 
immediate adaptation needs, which in turn are understood to be the 
additional costs imposed by climate change to render development climate-
resilient (ibid). Since ex ante calculation of additional costs of adaptation is 
complex, the GEF has developed a sliding scale for LDCF and SCCF 
funding which serves as a proxy for estimating additional costs. In terms of 
the sliding scale, smaller projects receive proportionately more GEF 
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funding than bigger ones, since they are assumed to have a higher 
adaptation component (GEF 2006). The scale provides an indication of the 
possible maximum amount of GEF funding for any given project size and 
its application is optional (UNFCCC, 2008, p. 44).  
The allocation criterion given above has evolved over a period of time. 
However it is necessary to take into account certain other factors when 
planning for adaptation financing in the post 2012 phase. In the case of 
adaptation, given the intrinsic difficulties of estimating additional costs, or 
separating global environmental benefits from domestic benefits, a 
financing criterion that focuses on incremental cost allocation and cost 
effectiveness (based on the truism that Incremental Costs on Investment 
(IC) ought to be less than International Benefits (IB)) is not enough (King, 
1993). The ideal allocation criteria should be based on outcomes and the 
incremental finance should focus on poorer or disadvantaged sections of 
communities. This can complement existing approaches based on a sliding 
scale to fund adaptation projects. 
The accepted model of finance disbursement, as has been noticed in 
the case of the GEF, is that of an operational entity set up by the COP of 
the Convention to carry out all business functions. This includes pooling of 
received money resources for provision of grants, concessional loans, risk 
guarantees etc through a fiduciary arrangement based on a Trust Fund 
approach. The Trust Fund is administered by a fund managing Trustee 
such as the World Bank, which also provides for a mechanism for 
monitoring and evaluating utilization of all financial resources. (Reed et al, 
2009, 8–11). The operating system routes its resources through an 
intermediary or an implementing agency (World Bank, UNDP, ADB etc.) 
which in turn provides technical advice to catalyze project preparation, 
design, execution and implementation. Delays in project cycles and funds 
disbursements, currently noted as affecting the efficiency of financial 
mechanisms such as the GEF Trust Fund, are largely attributed to the 
intermediation processes. The Adaptation Fund Board seeks to address this 
inadequacy by providing direct access to financial resources by the 
operating entity than its routing through an intermediary institution. China 
and G77 have proposed a like framework for future adaptation financing 
mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2008, p. 45).   
In more than one sense, efficiency and equity go together. As stated 
earlier, efficiency refers both to the total amount of development financing 
and to the match between financial instruments and the needs of 
developing countries (Sagasti et al, 2005). The needs of developing 
countries as relevant to adaptation funding include both the ability to 
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access funds and ability to use these funds, in line with the country’s 
adaptation (natural or directed) requirements. Thus flow of funds that are 
consistent with national action plans not only makes equity sense but also 
efficiency sense. The proposal to give up on intermediation is welcome 
insofar as it cuts down on delays in the project cycle. But given the fact 
that most of the intermediaries (or implementation agencies) carry out 
country programs in countries of action, it will be advisable to involve 
these agencies with project monitoring and evaluation in the post project 
approval phase. Countries that are short of capabilities in project design 
may find the role of intermediary institutions useful in the project cycle. 
(Reed et al 2009). 
Dimensions of Equity in Adaptation Financing 
There are four dimensions of ‘equity’ when it comes to climate change 
financing systems. The first dimension is adherence to the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility specified in Article 3.1 of the 
UNFCCC. The second dimension relates to honoring the needs of the 
economically less advantaged members of the FCCC. Where the principle 
of equity underlies financing systems, the notion of returns on investment 
is not the most significant consideration in resource allocation and 
deployment. In the context of environmental financing of global public 
goods, equity connotes allocation of funds to nation states or local 
communities that require them most. This is also consistent with the 
Rawlsian ‘difference principle’ (Rawls, 1971). Nation states and poor local 
communities which are not in a position to bear the costs of conservation 
ought to be the focus of an equity driven environmental financing system 
rather than nation states or communities that are able to conserve resources 
at the least cost. Typically private capital tends to flow to projects that 
afford the highest risk adjusted returns while international and national 
public finances like ODA and related budget grants, would gravitate 
towards projects that are high in social returns.2  
The third dimension of equity arises from climate financing being 
independent and supplementary to other forms of financing. The equity 
dimension of climate financing is not captured, if environmental financing 
is done at the cost of essential financial resources that a community 
requires for its developmental needs. Here the concept of equity comes 
closer to the notion of additionality. Indeed environmental financing could 
be at the expense of ODA flows. As mentioned, the Monterry target on 
ODA remains to be realized. Therefore environmental financing of global 
public goods projects should not be at the expense of potential ODA flows. 
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This will weaken the development process in Least Developed Countries 
that have been dependent on ODA. New revenue raising instruments like 
auctioning of emission trading permits or new carbon taxes contribute to 
the mobilization of resources that are new and additional. As far as climate 
change is concerned, financing of adaptation measures, from new and 
additional sources that are ‘over and above the Monterry target on ODA, 
would form the equity foundations of the post 2012 global environmental 
financing architecture.  
The fourth dimension of equity relates to ‘appropriateness’ of financial 
flows. Following Muller (2009, p. 22–23), appropriateness refers to a 
financial measure which considers adaptation to be a historical debt of 
developed countries towards developing countries (ibid, p. 22). In terms of 
the paradigm that views historical debt as an equity issue, since costs of 
adaptation has been imposed by developed countries on developing 
countries over time, any effort to have an adaptation financing system as a 
loan or even a conditional grant is perverse and inappropriate.   Thus loans 
and grants for adaptation are not appropriate even if they are concessional. 
Only unconditional transfer payments are appropriate. The full incremental 
costs of adaptation must be met by these transfer payments (Sethi, 2007)3. 
The concept of historical debt is thus philosophical and is fundamentally 
linked to ‘equity’ though this point is getting to be sidetracked.  Indeed 
Schelling (2006) argues that the principle of  historical obligations need to 
be built into a regime of allocation of CO2/GHG emission rights even in a 
regime of allocation of CO2 emission rights . For Schelling emission rights 
have to be allocated over decades, not just a decade at a time but 
cumulatively’(ibid). But as Friman and Linner (2008) explain, the take 
over of the ‘historical obligation debate’ by the ‘technology school’ (the 
STAP) in the UNFCCC has undermined the equity notion of the concept. 
Assessing the Stern Report in relation to Climate and Adaptation 
Financing 
As mentioned, the Stern Report (2008) clearly states that the task of 
preventing global warming must be effective, efficient and equitable. By 
effectiveness is meant cuts in GHG emissions on the required scale to keep 
risks at acceptable levels. But then this is best achieved by efficient 
financing systems that have intermediation systems that do not experience 
delays in project cycles, provide intermediation at low transaction costs 
and are compatible with the needs of developing countries. Let us now 
examine the concept of equity. The Stern Report considers equity to be 
where there is special focus on the needs of poor countries that are hardest 
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hit and undertaking of responsibilities by rich countries that have 
accounted for past emissions who demonstrate by 2020 that they can 
deliver credible reductions without threatening growth and designing 
systems for transfer of funds and technologies. The concept of equity in the 
context of a financial mechanism means the inception of a  mechanism that 
is ’new’ which implies the coming into effect of a source of financing that 
is different from existing ones , but is all the same premised on the  basic 
obligations and rights enshrined in the  FCCC. This implies a dedicated 
‘climate facility’. A new facility defined in this manner shall generate 
resources that are ‘additional’ to existing flow of development funds and 
funds projects or programmes that are consistent with national priorities, 
which are not necessarily the most cost-effective ones in terms of carbon 
emissions avoided. As mentioned earlier financial resources need to be 
allocated on a sliding scale as is done presently the case with the 
Adaptation Trust Fund where the emphasis should be based on end 
outcomes for the poorer or disadvantaged sections of communities than on 
the criteria of bankability. 
The aspect of ‘predictability’ is crucial to the equity dimension of a 
climate financing facility as any process that is not predictable can derail 
adaptation process. Existing public sources of climate financing are not 
predictable as they depend on the aid policies of donors. Private flows are 
also not predictable as they are determined by the state of the economy and 
state of business cycles. The problem with a carbon market mechanism is 
that while it is ‘new’, and ‘additional’, it is not predictable in terms of its 
ability to yield a consistent flow of resources due to volatile carbon 
allowances or permits prices. If not properly designed carbon markets may 
not meet with the norm of equity for other reasons, as we will discuss later.  
Given the inadequacies of all the three modes of financing, any 
reliance on one or the other instrument will not do justice to the goals of 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness set for the success of the FCCC. 
Consequently a climate financing mechanism should stand on the three 
pillars of public and private financing and carbon markets if the goal of an 
equitable climate pact is to be achieved. This is in spirit with the MEF 
recommendations and the position adopted by developing countries as 
well. 
Co-benefits Approach to Adaptation Financing and Equity 
An unexplored dimension of equity of adaptation financing is its inter-
linkage to mitigation commitments by developed countries. As the IPCC 
Third Assessment Report states that until 2050, global mitigation efforts 
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that are designed to cap GHGs at 550 ppm would benefit developing 
countries significantly particularly when combined with enhanced 
adaptation (IPCC, 2007, p. 827). In other words the co-benefit potential of 
mitigation actions is enormous. Currently the special  and differentiated 
responsibilities in the FCCC is interpreted in terms of differences in 
obligations to cut GHG and not in terms of  obligations to take on 
adaptation burden in developing countries as well. The co-benefit principle 
if applied to mitigation action can generate resources that are new, 
additional, adequate and predictable, besides being equitable, efficient and 
effective. This dimension has not been captured in the Stern Report. 
From the equity perspective, it is important that the co-benefits of 
adaptation and mitigation are premised on special and differentiated 
responsibilities. Fund flows for adaptation programmes are primarily 
driven by national resources and grants. Required as they are to 
quantitatively reduce CO2 emissions below the 1990 baseline, it is 
important for developed countries to take up financial commitments for 
funding adaptation activities in developing countries that are 
commensurate to their own mitigation processes. Fall in mitigation targets 
have to be matched by rise in adaptation financing. Conversely the greater 
the mitigation efforts, the lesser will be the scale of adaptation funding as 
adaptation costs will come down. The lower the adaptation burden, it frees 
up resources for developing countries to take to low carbon pathways. 
Adaptation is not an option for developing countries. It is a prime 
necessity to prevent their livelihood driven sectors from collapsing. India 
spends 2% of its GDP on adaptation and is expected to spend more as the 
worst impacts of climate change intensify (Saran, Shyam, 2009, p. 4). 
Agricultural systems in the developing world are already threatened by 
climate variability which increases their vulnerability to food insecurity 
(Bates Bryson et al (2008). The hydrological systems in the developing 
countries of Asia and Africa are threatened by climate change, resulting in 
serious imbalances in water budgets. Coastal areas in developing countries 
are also threatened by sea level rise.  
Low levels of mitigation efforts by developed countries, besides being 
against the spirit of obligations enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol, would 
only serve to increase adaptation costs for developing countries further 
(Lewellyn and Chaix, 2007).  
Table 1 brings out this fact in relation to the situation of coastal, semi-
arid agriculture, degraded forests and the water resources sectors with 
reference to the State of Karnataka in India. Based on modal values of 
costs / benefits accruing to the various sectors in current prices , elicited 
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through field surveys conducted in 2008, the relative loss of benefits or  
relative incremental costs have been  estimated in Columns 5 and 6. 
Amortized value of capital and operational costs have been taken to 
estimate the relative costs of various mitigation options, while  as far as 
benefits  are concerned, the same has been estimated in terms of damages 
avoided. It is evident that the softest adaptation measures are way below 
the most rigorous adaptation measures in terms of incremental costs or lost 
benefits.  
Table 1 
Relative Benefits Or Costs From Adaptation Projects For Different 
Mitigation Scenarios 
Modal values at 
current prices in INR 
Sl. 
No 
Sector 
 
Adaptation 
Activity 
 
Mitigation 
Level 
 Benefit2 Cost3
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Drought Resistant 
Plant Variety 
Low 0.30 - 
Just in Time 
Sustainable 
Irrigation 
Medium  0.60 - 
1 Agriculture 
Business-as-usual1 High 
Status quo 
(irrigated crops) 
 1.00 - 
Sea walls Low - 1.00 
Bio-shields 
(Mangrove 
plantations) 
Medium - 0.17 
2 Coastal Zone 
Business-as-usual1 
(Routine protection 
measures) 
High - 0.003 
Low transpiration Low - 1.00 
Medium 
transpiration 
Medium - 0.38 
3 Degraded 
Land  
Business-as-usual 
(High transpiration) 
High 
 
- 0.25 
Artificial recharge  Low - 1.00 
Natural recharge Medium - 0.09 
4 Water 
(groundwater
) Business-as-usual1 High - 0.01 
Notes: 
Business-as-usual – Current level of utilization of the natural resource without any 
adaptation activity being undertaken. 
Optimal yield of finger millets in Karnataka (probability) in dry land and irrigated 
conditions. 
Cost of undertaking the adaptation activity. 
  
16
The Economic Rationale of the Co-benefits from Mandatory CO2 
Mitigation 
Flexible mechanisms like CDM and JI are not substitutes for 
graduated and definitive tangible emission reductions by developed 
countries in their own soil. Rather they can weaken the foundations of 
efficient price discovery by carbon markets. This will be evident from Fig 
1 where MCm1 is the marginal curve of mitigation while MCa is the 
marginal cost of adaptation. It is evident from Fig 1 that the lower the 
abatement level, the higher the marginal cost of abatement and vice versa.  
At the point where MCa   intersects MCm1 curve, the carbon price is ‘P’, 
which corresponds` to an abatement level Q. Let us assume that Q is 
equivalent to the QERLO targets to be met by Annexure 1 countries under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Beyond Q, if abatement is sought to be achieved 
through ‘low cost or low quality and discounted‘ CDM and JI projects 
credits, the effect will be the creation of a kink in the MCm. curve. The new 
MCm3 curve which commences from Q along the MCa curve represents a 
low cost abatement trajectory for increased abatement beyond the QERLO. 
As abatement increases to Q2 the price of carbon falls to ‘P1’ from ‘P’. 
Ideally the carbon price should have risen if Annexure 1 countries had 
contributed to the increase in abatement level to Q2 and this would have 
happened if allowances   to emit were distinguished from voluntary 
mitigation units like CERs. At a carbon price of ‘P1’ the gap between 
MCm and MCa is the maximum, with supply of mitigation action being 
OQ1 as compared to the demand for adaptation action which is OQ2. This 
is clearly a non equilibrium situation that potentially creates a deadweight 
loss represented by the arc ‘Q1YQ2’. Besides, low carbon prices pulls down 
CER prices arising from CDM projects which acts as a disincentive to non 
Annexure 1 countries to undertake ‘one-sided selling of emissions credits’ 
as the Stern Report states. 
Mandatory CO2 reductions enable social cost of carbon to be better 
reflected in carbon marketplace, thus enabling the realization of a carbon 
market structure that recognizes the principle of ‘equitable burden sharing’. 
Thus apart from reasons of fulfilling the Kyoto obligations, developed 
countries need to undertake mitigation measures in the interests of 
developing countries that will have to bear the brunt of climate change. As 
a carbon saving asset, CERs need to realize revenue equal to MCm1. Over 
a period as MCmi shifts parallely due to cost-effective technological 
solutions, mandatory mitigation costs lower, resulting in lower carbon 
prices that is achieved without market distortion.  
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Fig. 1. Efficient Carbon Price Discovery: The Rationale of Mandatory Mitigation 
 
Towards an Equitable Carbon Market 
Developing countries, notably India, have maintained that financial 
flows from market mechanisms such as Cap and Trade can only be 
supplemental to and not a substitute for multilateral financing mechanisms 
that have been envisaged for adaptation and mitigation (Saran, 2009, p. 8). 
Much of the concerns about carbon markets arises from their non – 
transparency and deviation from the fundamental philosophical character 
of FCCC obligations. In case these deficiencies are addressed, carbon 
markets can be rendered efficient and equitable.  
While any efficient carbon market should ensure, as the Stern Report 
states, that carbon prices are maintained at levels which will provide 
incentives both for reductions at home and purchases from abroad’, there 
are certain broad equity principles that are specific to the FCCC that 
carbon markets are required to observe. Carbon markets should not 
promote substitution of mandatory mitigation with off setting efforts. This 
will violate the equity premises of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, 
besides creating an adverse policy environment for voluntary mitigation 
measures such as CDM projects in developing countries. Secondly they 
should assure a fair marketing system for sellers from developing 
countries, by ensuring price realization that is fair. The Stern Report avers 
that mitigation costs are minimal when undertaken in developing countries. 
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However if  the shadow costs of mitigation are incorporated that adjust 
upwards  low nominal wages  and capital costs of mitigation projects, the 
costs figures will be higher. Unless mitigation permits from developing 
countries are able to realize their ‘real values’, a carbon market cannot be 
considered equitable. 
As mentioned by the Stern Report, integration of carbon markets is a 
pre-requisite for a well functioning carbon market.  This is underscored by 
Tol (2009) when he refers to inter-carbon market arbitrages between the 
carbon markets in the US and Europe when it comes to carbon pricing. To 
a large extent, this has been conditioned by policies and the non integration 
of carbon markets in the world.  
The term carbon market needs to be broadly defined. Ideally a carbon 
market should function not only should to trade in a variety of emission 
permits , but also function as a capital sourcing mechanism to facilitate 
investments in clean technologies and associated services. Environmental 
stocks, bonds and securities are as important to the carbon markets as are 
permits. The depth and range of the carbon markets need to be richer to 
enable carbon markets function as an ideal resource allocation system.   
Apart from real time spot prices, a carbon market should promote 
price discovery mechanism that discovers futures markets of carbon 
permits. Over the Counter (OTC) transactions, as has been noticed in 
developing countries for CERs, do not promote a price discovery process 
that helps the sellers. To obviate OTC transactions it is important that 
sellers from developing countries have access at low transaction costs to 
organized exchanges that enable them meet a wide range of buyers. 
Consequently a carbon market that enables access and opportunities to 
both buyers and sellers would form an equitable system.  
Further carbon markets should distinguish permits and AAUs from 
CERs through different quality parameters. While AAUs are permits to 
emit and need to be discouraged, CERS are certificates of voluntary 
mitigation efforts (Muller,op.cit, p17). Further, the principle of special and 
differentiated principle enshrined in the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
requires voluntary mitigation products such as CERs originating from non 
Annexure 1 to be treated differently from AAUs.  These categories of 
assets cannot be clubbed together and treated as homogenous assets when 
it comes to trading. Value differentials between the instruments need to be 
laid down in terms of differing quality parameters. Similarly the role of 
carbon markets in promoting environmental investment instruments such 
as bonds and stocks, needs to be recognized.  
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Finally carbon markets need to be carefully regulated to prevent 
violent fluctuations in traded asset prices, induced by speculation that is 
not in tune with the fundamentals of supply and demand.  
Adaptation finances that source their requirements from revenues  
arising from mandatory mitigation activities are, in a more fundamentally 
more sense, more equitable  and can be helpful to developing contribute to 
undertake voluntary mitigation activities besides helping them to cope with 
climate stresses. Therefore carbon markets that facilitate sourcing of 
adaptation funding from mandatory mitigation activities function should 
form an important segment in the post 2012 financing architecture for 
climate change. This can be achieved if Governments in developed 
countries can generate revenues by auctioning larger chunks of allowances 
than give it away for free, motivated by political considerations 
(Metcalf,op.cit). 
Financing Based on the Co-Benefit Principle and implications for 
the Carbon Allowance Market 
The implication of the point above regarding auctioning of allowance 
can be far-reaching for the realization of an equitable market when situated 
against the backdrop of the co-benefit principle of mitigation. 
As already discussed at the outset, application of the co-benefit 
premise would link adaptation financing to mitigation activities. By nature, 
allowances afford certainty in quantitative reductions in CO2 emissions, 
unlike carbon taxes. In general free allowances tend to over-compensate 
firms and would use up resources that could be put towards other uses, 
including compensating the consumers who bear much of the burden 
(Stavins, 2007, p. 25). By reducing grandfathering, and auctioning permits, 
implicit subsidies are avoided thereby increasing the probability of 
quantitative reductions in CO2 emissions beyond targets. Auctioning a part 
of AAU involves the use of a new and additional finance instrument. 
Auctioning of permits causes revenue to accrue to the Government and is 
therefore available for redistribution amongst consumers or to investors in 
new technologies. Since AAUs allowances are allocated objectively 
(unlike EU-ETS allowances which suffered from excess allowance grants 
in the initial years) this ensures predictability for revenues generated by 
auctioning AAUs. Finally the proposal is workable.  
Private Investments in Adaptation Projects: Risk - Return Issues 
Adaptation by itself is an equity based term as it is related to 
livelihoods of poor people. It has an organic linkage to national action 
programmes on climate change in developing countries and hence enjoys 
greater national commitment. By contrast, the pro-poor credentials  of 
mitigation enabling activities in developed countries (like CDM projects) 
is not high as they are on project modes than on programme mode. But 
then it is precisely the project mode of CDM that attracts targeted foreign 
private flow of funds. There are opportunities for private sector to 
contribute to adaptation funding. However they have to overcome what 
Grubb (2007) refers to as the ‘risk of maladaptation’ arising from 
uncertainty in regional climate predictions, masking of natural climate 
variability and capital intensive nature of projects. Capital intensity can be 
a severe constraint and have to be matched by returns. Coastal zone 
projects, water sources and agriculture R &D are three promising areas for 
adaptation action in the Indian situation. 
However adaptation ‘projects’ associated with the coastal and water 
consevation  have a high beta factor and risks of uncertainty about returns, 
when it comes to returns on investments. Breach of sea walls, non 
realization of anticipated property values on shore lands that are protected 
by expensive sea walls, decline in groundwater quality from artificial 
recharge projects etc are potential risks on returns from such projects. 
(Damodaran, 2005). This is more so when capital intensive adaptation 
projects are taken up to provide for slow progress on the mitigation front. 
Indeed the higher the levels of mitigation, the lower the risks from 
adaptation projects and hence higher the risk adjusted return on adaptation 
projects. Private capital flows on adaptation projects will be higher if risks 
are less in relation to mean returns.  
Let ‘Ω’ be the optimal investment in mitigation projects and ‘I’ actual 
investments, given normal risks (σ), then  
 
σ   =        0, if I ≥ Ω 
               y, if I ≤  Ω 
                x, if 0 < I < Ω 
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In Figure 2, the concave curve that represents the efficient frontier of 
investment As the curve shifts from P1 to P2  investments on mitigation 
projects rises since the risks on adaptation projects decreases from OX to 
OY. This contributes to improved risk adjusted return from adaptation 
projects.  
enefits of Mitigation on Risks Return Patterns from Adaptation Projects 
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Fig. 2. Benefits of Mitigation on Risks Return Patterns from Adaptation Projects 
 
An Alternative Approach towards Assessment of Adaptation 
Financing Proposals  
The foregoing analysis calls for a different system of assessing the 
utility of various adaptation financing proposals. It is important that 
climate financing proposals in general and adaptation financing proposals 
in particular are based on the principle of co-benefits of mitigation and 
adaptation.  Proposals that meet the co-benefit criteria can be further 
situated within the maxims of ‘new and additional’ predictability, 
adequacy and equity parameters that relate to special and differentiated 
responsibilities and appropriateness. 
Various parties to the UNFCCC have submitted proposals for 
adaptation funding (UNFCCC 2008). Most of them have emanated during 
and after the Bali Summit of 2007. Of these five have been tabled by 
developing countries (or potential recipients) while three of them have 
emanated from the Annexure 1 countries/country blocs who are potential 
donors. 
The UNFCCC classifies the proposals on adaptation financing into 
three — One which looks at maintaining or increasing the scale of 
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contribution from existing mechanisms. Two which calls for defined 
budgetary contributions from developed countries. Three which seeks to 
raise contributions from market based instruments (UNFCCC, 2008).  
However in terms of the co-benefits criterion, the proposals can be 
categorized into two viz those that are linked to mandatory mitigation and 
those that are not. In the former category comes the Mexican, Swiss and 
the Norwegian proposals, the EU ETS proposal on levy on trading, carbon 
market levy, levy on aviation allowance auctions etc. In the latter category 
occur the proposals of China and G77, the EC, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
proposal on CDM levy and the GCSM.  
Sum Up 
The paper seeks to underline the philosophical significance of the 
maxims of environmental financing highlighted by the UNFCCC, in the 
light of the Stern Panel Report of 2008 and studies by other economists on 
the state of art on Climate economics.  The major proposition advanced in 
this paper is that carbon financing in general and adaptation financing in 
particular need to be situated within the matrix of co-benefits approach that 
is premised on mandatory mitigation action. A co-benefits approach to the 
issue of adaptation financing is equitable and economically efficient. The 
economic efficiency rationale of the co-benefits approach and mandatory 
mitigation action is that it avoids deadweight loss and ensures optimal 
social price of carbon. The paper seeks to demonstrate that as investments 
on mitigation rises, risks on adaptation projects decrease, thus contributing 
to improved risk adjusted return from adaptation projects. With reference 
to coastal, water and degraded lands ecosystems in India, the paper 
demonstrates how higher levels of mitigation efforts reduce the capital 
costs of adaptation activities in developing countries. The paper argues that 
a co-benefit approach that sources revenues from mandatory mitigation 
action based adaptation financing is economically sensible. Indeed such an 
approach alters the concept of equity by enhancing its scope. It will also 
provide scope for compensating developing countries by enhanced 
adaptation assistance in the wake of fall in mitigation targets by developed 
countries. While most of the adaptation financing proposals tabled during 
and after the Bali Action Plan, fulfill the requirements of ‘new, additional, 
predictable and adequate as conventionally described, the altered criteria of 
equity when employed to assess the different proposals places the 
Norwegian proposal in a favourable position. The Norwegian proposal 
while not being desirably adequate as compared to the transfer payments 
advocated by the G77 and China proposal, is new and additional, 
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predictable and more fundamentally speaking equitable insofar as it seeks 
to raise financial resource from mandatory mitigation obligations to 
exclusively fund adaptation programmes in developing countries. At the 
same time, the paper also argues that carbon markets are an indispensable 
element in the environmental financial architecture. However its scope 
needs to be enlarged and improved. Carbon markets need to be reformed 
through improved and varied functions that facilitate technology transfer, 
provide differential prices for different carbon products, facilitate enhanced 
access by developing country sellers and enable efficient carbon price 
discovery for sellers from developing world. Such an integrated 
perspective can lead to the formation of a global environmental financial 
architecture that addresses climate change problems besides more 
effectively addressing the critical needs of adaptation financing in 
developing countries in the post 2012 phase. 
 
(The views expressed in this paper are personal.) 
Notes 
1. ODA in particular, is stated to be unpredictable as it is subject to the 
will of legislatures in donor countries. (Muller, p. 21). 
2. As Muller states at present, all international funding instruments 
except the recently operationalised Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund are 
replenished through ODA-type bilateral voluntary contributions/donations 
(Muller op. cit. p. 21).  There are no predictable alternatives by way of 
private flows. International private flows like FDIs and FIIs are 
unpredictable and are dependent on macroeconomic variables (including 
interest rates), investment climate and capital market trends {UNFCCC 
(2008, p63) and Damodaran (2008, a)}.   
3. Sethi, Surya, 2008 as cited by Khor, Martin (2008). “Developing 
Countries Ask For New UNFCCC Financial Architecture” in South North 
Development Monitor (SUNS) No. 6491, 9, June 2008. The criticism about 
the World Bank Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience was on the 
ground that being a loan package it was not appropriate.  
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